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Abstract
This paper compares the performance of centralized and decentralized markets experimen-
tally. We constrain trading exchanges to happen on an exogenously predetermined network,
representing the trading relationships in markets with differing levels of connectivity. Our
experimental results show that, despite having lower trading volumes, decentralized markets
are generally not less efficient. Although information can propagate quicker through highly
connected markets, we show that higher connectivity also induces informed traders to trade
faster and exploit further their information advantages before the information becomes fully
incorporated into prices. This not only reduces market efficiency, but it increases wealth in-
equality. We show that, in more connected markets, informed traders trade not only relatively
quicker, but also more, in the right direction, despite not doing it at better prices.
Keywords: Experiments, financial markets, diffusion of information, decentralized trading.
JEL Classification: C92, D82, G14.
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1 Introduction
In the classical paradigm of competitive markets, no individual trader has market power, all
buyers can freely trade with all sellers, and all of their trades clear via a centralized market
mechanism that matches demand and supply. In reality, though, many markets are decentral-
ized and segregated, whereby not all traders are fully "connected" to each other. Segregation
may for instance occur because of information or transaction costs, which limit the ability or
willingness of some market participants to interact and trade with each other.
Examples of decentralized markets include the Over-the-Counter (OTC) markets where
many financial assets (e.g., foreign exchange, interest-rate and other derivatives, municipal and
corporate bonds, bank loans, private equity and real estate) and most durable goods are traded
in. In an OTC market investors can trade assets between each other directly and negotiate
terms privately, often facing incomplete and asymmetric information about the prices traded
elsewhere in the market. Investors may also buy or sell from dealers, thus improving overall
market connectivity. But, each customer typically approaches a subset of the dealers of the
market, limiting their ability to observe the best quotes. Dealers also trade with each other in
order to balance inventory and meet liquidity needs, but each dealer may only interact with a
subset of the dealers of the market.
Regulators have voiced increasingly serious concerns about (the size of) the OTC markets,
and the potential risks they create to the overall financial system. Following the disruption of
several OTC markets during the financial crisis of 2008 (e.g., credit derivatives, asset backed
securities, and repo agreements), many commentators and policy makers blamed decentralized
trading for the inability of traders to quickly identify the prices of assets, thereby exacerbating
the severity of the crisis. As a response, the Group of Twenty (G-20) committed to a variety of
far-reaching regulatory reforms to contain the "threat posed by OTC trading on the financial
system," including a move to trading securities on centralized, fully connected exchanges where
other financial assets like stocks are traded.
The main concern against decentralized markets is, indeed, their ability to aggregate pri-
vately dispersed information. In an informationally efficient market asset prices reflect all
available information. Efficiency can be achieved because traders owning private information
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on the value of an asset (the ’insiders’) seek to profit from mispricing, as long as prices do not
fully embody their private information. If markets are efficient, insiders’ private information is
worthless in the long run. But insiders can realize higher gains than other traders in the short
run. Uninformed traders can also infer (and benefit from) the existence of insider information
by observing the trading activity. This can either accelerate the process of convergence to-
wards efficiency, or drive it away, if uninformed traders are mistaken in their inferences, as the
literature on informational cascades demonstrates (Bikhchandani et al., (1998), Topol (1991)).
This paper shows, experimentally, that indeed decentralized markets do not necessarily
perform worse than centralized markets. Experimental methods are particularly suitable to
test the performance of decentralized markets, as they can incorporate some of the inherent
complexities of non-fully connected, segregated markets that have to be neglected in theoret-
ical models. Field work is also unable to observe some of the crucial variables, such as the
fundamental value of financial assets and the distribution of information among traders. The
experimental approach allows us to exogenously control traders’ preferences and trading part-
ners, as well as their private information, while market efficiency and wealth inequality can
be directly measured. Despite the relevance of decentralised markets, and the potential of
experimental work, we know of very few experimental studies that have explored the efficiency
properties of these markets and compared them to those of the centralized markets.
Subjects in our experiment can trade a financial asset with an uncertain payoff. Priorly, they
receive private and, in some treatments, public signals about the true value of the asset. We
constrain trading exchanges to happen on an exogenously predetermined network. Networks
are a natural tool to represent the trading relationships in markets with decentralized trade
and intermediation.1 Traders can buy and sell an asset via ’personalized’ a limit order book,
in which they can see, and match, the bids and asks of the traders they are linked to in the
trading network. This design feature, used in reality in some foreign exchange markets, allow
us to change the connectivity of the market, spanning from fully connected centralized to
1In decentralized markets, stable buyers-sellers trading relationships are usually formed. For example Kirman
and Vriend (2001) show that loyalty networks exist between buyers and sellers in the Marseille fish market. In this
respect, a decentralized market can essentially be represented as a graph in which the nodes correspond to traders
and the edges represent potential (or realised) trading relationships between pairs. When the network is complete,
every possible trading opportunity is present and therefore there is no constraint on trading patterns. On the other
hand, the incompleteness of the network signifies that some traders are unable to trade with each other. This implies
either the pure loss of trading opportunities or the fact that an intermediation service is required for trading.
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bilateral/multilateral trading markets without changing the price formation mechanism.2
Our market-level results show that trading volume increases significantly when connectivity
increases. But market efficiency does not significantly improve with connectivity. Conceptually,
connectivity has two opposing effects on market efficiency and wealth distribution. On the one
hand, information can propagate quicker through highly connected markets, reducing market
inefficiency and profit opportunities from information asymmetry (which is the standard ar-
gument against OTC markets). But, on the other hand, higher connectivity allows informed
traders to trade faster with several counterparties and exploit their information advantages
further, before information becomes fully incorporated into the price. This may not only in-
crease wealth inequality but also reduce efficiency, as it is more likely to generate informational
cascades. Our results show that the latter effect may be more important than the first, thus
associating higher connectivity to more wealth inequality and not necessarily to more efficiency.
Thus, our market-level results suggest that informed traders, the "insiders," can better
exploit their information advantages when markets are better connected. We subsequently
investigates how insiders’ strategies are affected by the degree of market decentralization. In-
formed traders in our setup have to balance two opposite effects when deciding on their trading
strategies. On the one hand, they may opt to refraining from trading early due to the fear of
being detected. On the other hand, they may feel compelled to make use of their information
rather quickly, in fear that other insiders may take advantage of their information and exploit
the uninformed ("outside") investors before they themselves can. Our experimental evidence
shows that the latter effect may dominate the former. We show that insiders gain dispropor-
tionately more than outsiders in better connected networks by trading, not only quicker, but
more, in the right direction, despite not doing it at better prices.
Therefore, our paper also contributes to the literature on insider trading by showing that
superiorly informed traders are able to earn larger profits in centralized markets, and how.
Insider trading remains an important concern of regulators because its effects have not been
totally clarified. The primary argument against insider trading is that it works to the disadvan-
tage of outsiders (who may ultimately exit the marketplace). The argument in favor of insider
2Several platforms in the foreign exchange spot market use a similar arrangement, or quasi-centralized limit order
book structure, including Reuters, EBS, and Hotspot FX, which together facilitate a mean turnover in excess of 0.6
trillion US dollars (USD) each day (Gould et al., 2016).
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trading is that such trading leads to more informative security prices. We find evidence that
the former may be more of a concern in centralized markets, without having the advantages of
the latter. To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to compare the resulting levels of wealth
inequality of centralised and decentralised markets.
2 Literature review
While the microstructure of markets is recognized as an important determinant of the degree
of market efficiency, there is still limited academic work comparing how centralised and decen-
tralised markets perform. Recent theoretical papers have started challenging the conventional
wisdom that points to the informational inefficiencies of decentralized as compared to central-
ized markets. Malamud and Rostek (2017), for instance, argue that decentralized markets may
allocate more risk to less risk-averse agents, thus providing higher total welfare. Glode and
Opp (2016) argue that the delays associated with decentralized trading can incentivize traders
to choose less aggressive, socially more efficient trading strategies.
Despite the potential of the experiments in this area, we know of very few experimental
studies that have compared the efficiency properties of decentralized and centralized markets.
Attanasi et al (2013) is, to our knowledge, the only existing study using (classroom) experi-
ments to compare OTC markets, in which each agent looks for the best counterpart through
bilateral negotiations, and continuous double action (CDA) market mechanisms. Rather than
connectivity, they focus on counterparty search and quote opacity, also typical of decentralised
markets, and from which we deliberately abstract from in our study to concentrate on the role
of connectivity. In their setting, centralized markets outperform decentralized ones.
A recent paper related to ours is Halim et al (2019), which also embeds an exogenous
network structure within the framework of a Arrow-Debreu security market. In contrast to
ours, the network provides a mechanism to share the imperfect information purchased by the
individuals. The paper shows that costly information sharing through social communication
networks increases trading volume. The authors interpret this counter intuitive result as a
consequence of risk sharing opportunities among risk adverse traders rather than because in-
vestors are irrational. With social communication, while prices are more precise, i.e. closer to
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the Bayesian posterior, they are less informative. This is because a lower number of signals
is purchased as a result of the free riding incentive provided by the sharing mechanism. Net
earnings and welfare are higher with information sharing and, in contrast to our results, the
extent of information aggregation increases with the density of the information network.3
These papers are part of a growing experimental literature on market efficiency. Broadly,
the literature has incorporated information asymmetries in two principal ways. The first is to
provide some of the traders in the market with superior (perfect) information. The alternative
is to provide all traders with heterogeneous information. Early studies indicated that, when
information is asymmetric but perfect, markets have a strong tendency to disseminate private
information provided that enough individuals hold the information. These early studies sug-
gest that efficiency increases with both the number of insiders and the experience of traders. A
more recent literature, assuming more complex informational environments, such as imperfect
information, has shown however, that information dispersed in the market is imperfectly incor-
porated into prices (Biais et al., 2005; Hanson et al., 2006; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2010; Corgnet
et al., 2015, Lionel and Siemroth, 2018 ). In the context of decentralized markets, other ex-
perimental papers have found deviations from full informational efficiency (Huber et al., 2011;
Bossaerts et al., 2013; Asparouhova et al., 2017).
Some papers focus on the pricing mechanism. Cason and Friedman (1996) compare, for
instance, the performance of the continuous double auction (CDA), the uniform price double
auction (UPDA), the single call market (SCM) and the multiple call market (MCM). The
authors find that mean prices deviate the least from the Competitive Equilibrium (CE) pre-
diction in the SCM, and the deviations for UPDA are no greater than the deviations in the
MCM and CDA. This suggests that the increase in transaction opportunities afforded by the
market arrangements causes prices to deviate more rather than less from the CE range. This
result partly agrees with our finding as we also find that fully connected markets
are less efficient.
Subsequent papers make similar comparisons in different informational settings. Schnitzlein
(1996) compares continuous and call auctions in the presence of a single informed insider. He
3In a theoretical paper Colla and Mele (2010) consider a model with strategic traders who are locally connected
to common sources of information about the long term value of an asset. They also find that, compared to a market
without network connections, a market with information linkages is characterized by higher volume, efficiency, and
in general, higher liquidity.
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finds that, that the call market provides higher liquidity and lower costs to uninformed noise
traders at the expense of slightly less efficient prices. Theissen (2000) compares call markets,
continuous double auctions, and dealer markets in a setting with sequential information arrival
in the absense of insider trading. He finds that, while opening prices in the call market are
closest to the true value of the asset, the continuous auction and the dealer markets are more
efficient at the average period price level. In a setting where uninformed traders cannot be
sure about the presence of insiders, Morone and Nuzzo (2015) compare the single-unit double
auction institution with a multiple call auction mechanism. The authors show that the call
auction institution promotes better convergence toward the efficient price when no insiders are
in the market. Contrarily, when insiders are in the market, none of the two institutions presents
an informational efficiency advantage.
To summarize, the experimental evidence so far suggests that call markets are not inferior
to continuous auction and dealer markets. Our paper contributes to this debate and pro-
vides additional evidence that increasing the connectivity does not monotonously
increase market efficiency.
3 The Experimental Design
We run a series of independent experimental “markets” where we allow 15 subjects to contin-
uously trade between each other for a period of 3 minutes. At the beginning of each market,
each trader is endowed with 10 units of an asset as well as with 1000 units of experimental
currency (ECU). Each unit of the asset pays a dividend D at the end of the market, where D
is equal to 0 or 10 ECUs with equal probability.4 The dividend payout is randomly determined
at the beginning of the market, but it is not revealed to the traders until the end of the market.
It is common knowledge that the two possible dividend values are equiprobable. Apart from
the dividend payout, the asset is worthless.
We use a network framework to exogenously restrict the subjects’ ability to trade between
each other, which allows us to compare the performance of centralized and decentralized mar-
kets. Prior to the experiment, we created three different network structures of 15 nodes. In
4The high level of cash ensures that traders are not cash-constrained. As shown later, trader profits will be defined
in terms of the gains/losses relative to the initial level of cash.
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Figure 1: The networks used in the centralized/highly connected (HC), medium connected (MC)
and low connected (LC) treatments. The numbers represent the nodes to which traders are ran-
domly assigned in each market of each treatment.
each of them, the edges between the nodes had a probability p of being activated, independent
across edges. We used three different probabilities: p = 1 (a fully/highly connected market,
"HC"), p = 0.33 (a medium connected market, "MC") and p = 0.2 (a low connected market,
"LC").5 Figure 1 illustrates the three realized networks (HC, MC, and LC). These three net-
work structures give rise to three different treatments. The network structure in each treatment
is fixed but each trader is randomly assigned to one of nodes of the network at the beginning
of each market. All probabilities (but not the realizations) are known by the subjects.
Trading is organized as a networked double auction market, allowing us to change the
connectivity of the market without changing the price formation mechanism. Subjects can
submit (and withdraw) “bids”, i.e., (non-necessarily integer) prices at which they are willing
to buy one unit of the asset, and “asks”, i.e., (non-necessarily integer) prices at which they are
willing to sell one unit of the asset, to a limit order book. At any point in time, offered quotes
(bids and asks) can be accepted by the other traders. But the quotes of a trader will only
be available to those traders she is connected to in the network. In other words, each subject
can only observe and accept quotes of her “local” limit order book. Figure 2 below shows an
example of a (“global”) limit order book and the resulting local limit order book of subject 7,
who is connected to subjects 3, 8, 13 and 14 but not 5, 6, 7, 9, 10 and 15.
Subjects receive noisy “signals” about the realized dividend value at the beginning of the
5The probabilities of 0.33 and 0.2 are chosen so that the average degree is 5 = 15 ∗ 0.33 and 3 = 15 ∗ 0.20, respec-
tively, one third and one fifth of the number of traders, 15. Both of these probabilities are above the “percolation”
threshold, pc = 1/15 = 0.067, which allows information to be diffused.
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Figure 2: Negative levels of depth represent bids (willingness to buy) whereas positive levels repre-
sent asks (willingness to sell)
market. Signals are presented to the subjects as taking values of 0 or 10. A signal of 0 (10)
means that the realized dividend is 0 (10) with probability q and 10 (0) with probability 1− q.
In the main analysis, we set (and it is common knowledge that) q = 0.8. For q = 0.8 the
expected (Bayesian) price is very close to the dividend.6 In an extension, we compare the main
results with those obtained when lowering the precision of the private signal to q = 0.66.7
In all markets, each subject receives two private signals. As the realizations of the private
signals across traders are different, their expected values of the fundamental are different and
mutually agreable trades are possible. In some markets, subjects also receive a common public
signal. Because of the importance of public signals, the trading environment is very different
depending on whether the public signal is available, and if so, whether it is correct, i.e. equal
to the true dividend. This makes us compare performance under three different trading envi-
ronments: "No Public Info", "Correct Public Info" and "Incorrect Public Info." As compared to
the case of no public information, a correct public signal narrows substantially the price range
over which most of mutually agreeable trades are possible, whereas an incorrect public signal
6COMPUTE The expected price, P , conditional on the total information available in the market, using bayesian
inference, would be:
P = 10 · Pr(D = 10|I) + 0 · Pr(D = 0|I) = 10
[
1 +
(1− q
q
)η]−1
, (1)
where N denotes the total number of subjects in the market, η the quantity of "net" private signals that suggest
the dividend is 10 (number of private signals with value 10 minus number of private signals with value 0), I the
information available in the market.
7COMPUTE In that case, the expected (Bayesian) price is not identical to the dividend. Still, as we control for
the quality of the net private information, we measure inefficiency relative to the dividend.
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widens it substantially.8
Subjects’ net profits in each market consist of the dividend paid out and the gains or losses
generated by the trading activity. Formally,
Πi ≡ SiTD + (CiT − Ci0), (2)
where SiT is the number of stocks held by subject i at the end of the market and Ci0 and CiT
are, respectively, her initial and final cash. Her final cash is determined by her initial cash, the
price received for the units sold and the price paid for the units bought. Subjects can exchange
as many assets as desired, as long as they have enough cash or assets (no short-sale is allowed).
Subjects’ final payoffs are computed as the accumulated profits of the markets run in the
session, and paid in cash at the end of the session.9 In total, we run 6 treatments (highly,
medium and low connectivity and with and without public information). Each treatment is
run in a separate session with 15 subjects (each subject could only participate in one session).
But each session consisted of a number of independent markets. As the public signal may be
correct or incorrect, i.e. equal or different to the realized dividend, we doubled the number of
8Let’s assume the correct dividend is D = 10. In the main analysis (with signal precision q = 0.8), the probability
a given trader has two correct signals is 64%, one correct signal is 32% and two wrong signals is 4%. On average,
out of 15 participants, the number of "informed" agents who receive two correct private signals is N2 = 9.6, the
number of agents who receive one correct signal is N1 = 4.8 and the number of agents receiving two wrong signals
is N0 = 0.6. In case no public signal is released, the value of the fundamental expected by an agent endowed with x
private signals suggesting that the true dividend is D = 10, fx0 , is given by f20 = 9.41 (using equation 1 with η = 2),
agents who have one correct and one wrong signal will f10 = 5 and f00 = 0.59. Thus, in a fully connected market the
(initial) number of pairs who can potentially mutually agree on the price (if agents were risk neutral) would then be
N2 ∗N1 + (N2 +N1) ∗N0 = 46.1 + 8.6 = 54.7.
In case a public signal is released, and assuming agents expectation of the fundamental is derived by equally
weighting three signals, the expected value of the fundamental for an agent who has x signals suggesting that the
dividend is D = 10 is f30 = 9.85, f20 = 8, and f10 = 0.66 and f00 = 0.15. While the number of potential trading
partners is the same as in the case without public information, if the public signal is correct, the price range over
which most of mutually agreeable trades are possible (that is between N2 and N1) is narrower at [8, 9.85] versus [5,
9.41]. As a result we expect to observe a decrease in trading volume when the public signal is correct. If the public
signal is wrong, the price range over which most of mutually agreeable trades are possible is wider [0.66, 8] and as a
result we would expect more trading volume when public information is wrong than when no public information is
released.
When the information is correct 66% of the times (the low precision case), the probability a subject has two correct
signals is 43.5%, one correct signal is 45%, and two wrong signals is 11.5%. On average, out of 15 participants, 6 have
2 correct signals, 7 have one correct and one wrong signals and 2 have two wrong signals. The expected values of the
fundamentals in the low precision case are f20 = 7.90, f10 = 5, f00 = 2.10. While the initial range over which trade
can be agreed is narrower in this case, the number of pairs who initially can potentially trade (in a fully connected
market) increases to (42 + 26= 68).
9One experimental currency unit is equivalent to 2 cents of e. The average payoff is about 20e and each session
lasted around 90 minutes. Note that subjects can make losses. To avoid some of the problems associated with
subjects making real losses in experiments, we endow all subjects with a participation fee of 5e, which can be used
to offset losses. No subject earned a negative final payoff in any session.
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sessions (and markets) of the treatments with public information for a total of 9 sessions.
The different treatments implemented as well as the per treatment number of markets,
agents and signals, as well as the per-treatment average number of markets with the high
dividend and with the correct public signal, are displayed in Table 1. We also include the per-
market average number of net correct private signals, defined as the number of correct minus
the number of incorrect private signals in the market.
4 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Our variables, described in the following subsections, are defined at the market, subject and
transaction levels. The summary descriptive statistics are described in Table 2.
4.1 Market Level
We define the following dependent variables at the market level: trading volume, inefficiency
and inequality. Trading volume Vm in market m is defined as the total number of times the
assets have been traded by any pair of agents in that market (each transaction involves one
unit of the asset). As shown in Table 2, the trading volume differs depending on the availability
and the quality of the public signal. As suggested earlier, the price range over which mutually
agreeable trades are theoretically possible is narrower, and the actual trading volume is lower,
when public information is released and it is correct than when it is not released. On the
contrary, the price range over which mutually agreeable trades are possible is wider, and the
trading volume is higher, when public information is released and it is wrong.
Market inefficiency Inefm in market m is defined as the average deviation of the price of
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
Dividend Public Signal Private Signals
Treatments Num of Markets Num of Agents Number of Signals D=10 Correct Net Private Info.
HC No Pub. Info. 10 15 30 0.30 - 18.4
MC No Pub. Info. 14 15 30 0.28 - 17.8
LC No Pub. Info. 15 15 30 0.46 - 18.8
HC Pub. Info. 30 15 31 0.60 0.80 18.7
MC Pub. Info. 30 15 31 0.46 0.73 19.2
LC Pub. Info. 30 15 31 0.46 0.77 18.6
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All Observations No Public Info. Correct Public Info. Incorrect Public Info.
Obs. Mean Median Min. Max. Mean Mean Mean
Trading volumes 129 54.4 50 23 123 58.7 50.4 59.4
Inefficiency 129 2.19 1.81 0.07 8.14 2.95 1.07 4.46
Inequality 129 0.027 0.021 0.0008 0.132 0.040 0.013 0.052
Profit 1,935 46.51 28.3 -299.8 358.1 35.8 47.8 61.9
Stock Bought 1,935 3.62 1 0 83 3.92 3.35 3.96
Stock Sold 1,935 3.62 2 0 17 3.92 3.35 3.96
Stock Held 1,935 10 9 0 93 10 10 10
Price 7,017 4.95 5 0 10 4.19 5.05 6.05
Informed Agent 1,935 0.67 1 0 1 0.66 0.67 0.68
Connected Agent 1,935 0.46 0 0 1 0.50 0.44 0.47
Informed Buyer 7,017 0.65 1 0 1 0.57 0.68 0.74
Informed Seller 7,017 0.66 1 0 1 0.66 0.65 0.68
Connected Buyer 7,017 0.15 0 0 1 0.14 0.16 0.17
Connected Seller 7,017 0.18 0 1 1 0.19 0.18 0.20
Time 7,017 89.2 86 3 180 87.9 89.2 91.6
each transaction from the fundamental (realized dividend), i.e.,
Inefm =
1
Vm
Vm∑
j=1
|Pj,m −Dm|, (3)
where Pj,m is the price of transaction j in market m and Dm the dividend in market m. As
we can see in Table 2, inefficiency is greatest when the public signal exists and it is incorrect
and lowest when the public signal exists but it is correct.
Market inequality is measured by the “Gini coefficient” of the individual profits of the 15
participants in the market, i.e.,
Ineqm =
∑
i
∑
j
∣∣Πim −Πjm∣∣
2 ∗ 15∑
i
Πim
,
where the profits Πim of agent i market m are computed at the end of the market, taking into
account the gains or losses generated by the trading activity and the dividend paid out at the
end, as described in (2). The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion. A Gini
coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality, while a Gini coefficient of one expresses maximal
inequality. However, a value greater than one may occur if the profits take negative values.
We thus rescale profits by adding a common value across all markets and treatments, in order
to make the lowest profit observation equal to zero. As in the case of inefficiency, inequality
is greatest when the public signal exists and it is incorrect and lowest when the public signal
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exists but it is correct.
Our independent variables at the market level include dummies for connectivity: low and
medium connectivity, as opposed to full connectivity, our base category. We also include
dummies for having a correct public signal and an incorrect one, using the no public information
as the default category. In terms of private signals, we use the number of net correct private
signals, i.e. the number of correct minus the number of incorrect ones, as shown in Table 1.
4.2 Subject and Transaction Levels
We define the following dependent variables at the individual subject level: profits, stock
bought, stock sold and stock held. Stock bought and sold counts the units of the asset bought
and sold, respectively, by the agent during the market. Stock held counts the units of the asset
held at the end of the market. Consistent with the trading volume results, the average number
of stocks bought/sold described in Table 2 are lowest when public information is released and
it is correct, and highest when public information is released and it is wrong. Average stock
held at the end is of course equal to the initial endowement.
As independent variables, we use a dummy variable named "Informed agent", which takes a
value of 1 if the subject has received two correct private signals, and a dummy variable named
"Connected agent" which takes a value of 1 if the number of edges it has (the degree) is above
the median in that market. As the probability of receiving a correct signal is 0.8, the fraction
of informed traders is (approximately) 0.64.
At the transaction level, we can use the price of the transaction as a dependent variable.
As independent variables, we can include characteristics of the two agents involved in the
transaction, such as whether the buyer or the seller is “Informed” or “Connected.” We can also
include the second in which that transaction occurs.
5 Experimental Results
We present the experiment results in three steps. We first show that (and provide an explana-
tion for why) decentralized markets may not be more inefficient, despite involving less trade,
with the advantage of generating less inequality between traders. We then dig deeper into the
13
determinants of profits at the individual trader level. We show that informed traders perform
better, especially in the presence of connectivity, because they manage to trade more in the
right direction (although not at better prices). In the last subsection, we compare the main
results to the case in which signals are less precise.
5.1 Market Performance of Decentralized Markets
This subsection compares the performance of decentralized versus centralized markets using
market level data. We show both box plots and regression analysis results. The boxes plot
the first and the third quartiles, and the band inside the boxes the second quartile (i.e., the
median).10 In the regression analysis, we first pool all the observations of all treatments and
then we separate them by the availability and quality of the public information.
Lower trading volumes. The left panel of Figure 3 illustrates the box plots of the mar-
ket trading volume by treatment. Intuitively, trading volume decreases when connectivity de-
creases, as the number of potential trading partners decreases. The reduction of trade volumes
is especially important when moving from high connectivity (centralized market) to medium
connectivity (decentralized but more connected than the low connectivity market). This is true
independent of the availability and quality of the public information.11
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Figure 3: Market Trading Volume, Inefficiency and Inequality
10The whiskers extend up to 1.5 times the interquartile range from the top/bottom of the box to the furthest
datum within that distance. If there are any data beyond that distance, they are represented individually as points
(’outliers’).
11A Mann-Whitney test (two sample t-test) rejects the null hypothesis of equal median (equal mean) at 1 %
significance level between each pair of connectivity treatments (HC, MC and LC) within each of the three public
signal environments (No Public Info, Correct Public Info and Incorrect Public Info).
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Table 3: Market Trading Volume Estimations
All No Public Info. Correct Public Info. Incorrect Public Info.
Medium Connectivity −30.419∗∗∗ −48.232∗∗∗ −24.506∗∗∗ −22.666∗∗
(6.053) (0.236) (5.334) (7.584)
Low Connectivity −40.309∗∗∗ −58.389∗∗∗ −31.268∗∗∗ −37.625∗∗∗
(5.425) (0.174) (3.490) (4.909)
Correct Public Info. −11.412∗
(5.290)
Incorrect Public Info. −0.520
(5.309)
Net Private Info. −0.491 −1.611∗ 0.032 −0.405
(0.282) (0.434) (0.371) (0.947)
Constant 94.234∗∗∗ 128.146∗∗∗ 68.033∗∗∗ 88.241∗∗∗
(9.981) (7.993) (8.794) (14.148)
Observations 129 39 69 21
R-squared 0.60 0.79 0.49 0.70
Trading volume is defined as the total number of times the assets have been traded by any pair of agents in that market.
Low and medium connectivity are dummy variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and incorrect
public information are dummy variables where no public information is the base category. The number of net correct private
signals measures the difference between total number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard
errors corrected for market-level clustering, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
These results are confirmed in the regressions shown in Table 3. The coefficients of the dum-
mies for medium and low connectivity are negative and strongly significant in all the regressions,
both in the pooled sample in column 1 as well as when separating out by the availability and
the quality of the public information in columns 2-4. The coefficient for the low connectivity
is more negative than the one for medium connectivity. Thus, in decentralized markets, trad-
ing volume is lower than in centralized markets, and as connectivity of decentralized markets
decreases trading volumes decrease further.
Column 1 also shows that trading volume is lower when the public signal is correct, com-
pared to the case of no public signal, as the probability of finding mutually agreeable prices
is lower. If the public signal is incorrect, the trading volume is not significantly different than
when it is not available. Interestingly, the quality of the private information is only relevant in
the case in which the public is not available. As shown in the second column, the number of
net correct private signals reduces trading volume when the public signal is not available.
Not more inefficient. The central panel of Figure 3 shows the box plots of market
(in)efficiency. Not surprisingly, market inefficiency is greatest when the public signal is in-
15
correct, and lowest when the public signal is correct. But, conditional on the availability and
the quality of the public information, the level of inefficiency is similar across the three different
levels of connectivity.12 Dynamically, we can identify a similar pattern if we depict how the
price evolves as the asset gets traded, i.e., as a function of the transaction number. Indeed, Fig-
ure 4 shows that the price per transaction number (averaged across all markets with the same
level of connectivity and availability and quality of the public information) does not get closer
to the dividend in the case of centralized than in the less connected markets, despite including
more transactions. In the case the public information is incorrect, the price in centralized
markets remains, in fact, clearly further away from the dividend.
Add comments to figure 5
All these results are confirmed in the pooled regressions in the first column of Table 4. The
dummy of correct public information has a negative, significant effect on the level of market
inefficiency whereas the dummy of incorrect public information has a positive, significant ef-
fect.13 In contrast, the dummies of connectivity do not have significant effects in the overall
regression. In the case of no public information, inefficiency in decentralized markets is even
lower than in centralized markets, as shown by the negative and significant coefficients. Only in
the case of correct public information and highly decentralized markets, decentralization leads
to less efficiency than centralization.
The regressions also show, both overall and in the split samples, that efficiency is greater if
the quality of the private information increases. The coefficient for the net number of correct
private signals is always negative and almost always significant. Comparing the magnitudes,
the private signals are more important when there is no public signal and, especially, when
there is but it is incorrect.
Less unequal. The right panel of Figure 3 shows that wealth inequality is generally greater
in centralized and in more connected markets. This is especially the case when the public
information is not available or when it is incorrect, although in the latter there is a lot more
12A Mann Whitney test (two sample t-test) fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal median (equal mean) at 1
% significance level between each pair of connectivity treatments (HC, MC and LC) within each of the three public
signal environments (No Public Info, Correct Public Info and Incorrect Public Info).
13Ruiz-Buforn et al. (2016) have already shown that the disclosure of an incorrect public information might drive
market prices far from the market fundamentals, even in cases where the private information present in the market
is sufficient to offset misleading public information. This suggest that traders have a tendency to overestimate the
value of public information, or have a public information bias.
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Table 4: Market Inefficiency Estimations
All No Public Info. Correct Public Info. Incorrect Public Info.
Medium Connectivity −0.175 −0.370∗∗∗ −0.100 0.464
(0.211) (0.016) (0.221) (0.817)
Low Connectivity 0.105 −0.036∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.453
(0.176) (0.012) (0.119) (0.815)
Correct Public Info. −1.804∗∗∗
(0.109)
Incorrect Public Info. 1.589∗∗∗
(0.239)
Net Private Info. −0.131∗∗∗ −0.199∗∗ −0.058† −0.225∗∗
(0.027) (0.029) (0.034) (0.057)
Constant 5.387∗∗∗ 6.754∗∗∗ 2.088∗∗ 8.372∗∗∗
(0.530) (0.536) (0.691) (1.038)
Observations 129 39 69 21
R-squared 0.66 0.38 0.16 0.31
Market inefficiency is defined as the deviation of the price of each transaction from the realized dividend as in Equation
3. Low and medium connectivity are dummy variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and incorrect
public information are dummy variables where no public information is the base category. The number of net correct private
signals measures the difference between total number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard
errors corrected for market-level clustering, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
variance across markets. In case the public information is correct, inequality is low and fairly
similar across levels of connectivity. This is because agents are more homogeneously informed
via the release of a correct public signal about the true value of the asset.14
This is again confirmed in the regressions in Table 5. The dummies of medium and low
connectivity have significant effects both in the overall regression as well as in the case of no
public information. In the case the public signal is available, the effects of connectivity are
less significant. In the pooled regression in the first column, the dummy of correct public
information has a negative, significant effect on the level of inequality whereas the dummy of
incorrect public information has a positive, although not very significant, effect on inequality.
The regressions also show, both overall and in all the split samples, that inequality is lower if
the quality of the private information increases. The coefficient for the net number of correct
private signals is always negative, albeit not always highly significant.
14A Mann Whitney test (two sample t-test) rejects the null hypothesis of equal median (equal mean) at 1 %
significance level between HC-LC markets when there is no public information.
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Table 5: Market Inequality Estimations
All No Public Info. Correct Public Info. Incorrect Public Info.
Medium Connectivity −0.015∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.007† −0.015
(0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.016)
Low Connectivity −0.018∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.029†
(0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.017)
Correct Public Info. −0.027∗∗∗
(0.005)
Incorrect Public Info. 0.013∗
(0.006)
Net Private Info. −0.002∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.001† −0.003†
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Constant 0.096∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.015) (0.009) (0.027)
Observations 129 39 69 21
R-squared 0.54 0.71 0.08 0.42
Market inequality is calculated with gini coefficient as explained in Equation 4. Low and medium connectivity are dummy
variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and incorrect public information are dummy variables where
no public information is the base category. The number of net correct private signals measures the difference between total
number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard errors corrected for market-level clustering,
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
Why less trading and less unequal but not more inefficient? Decentralized or
less connected markets, despite having lower trading volumes and less inequality, are gener-
ally not more inefficient. Although many traders have correct private information, and all
traders observe each others’ actions, higher number of transactions of centralised markets is
not sufficient to improve on the revelation of the true fundamental value.
Notice that, conceptually, connectivity has two opposing effects on market efficiency and
wealth distribution. On the one hand, information can propagate quicker through highly con-
nected markets, reducing market inefficiency and profit opportunities from information asym-
metry (which is the standard argument against OTC markets). But, on the other hand, higher
connectivity not only allows but also induces (because of fear of competition) informed traders
to trade faster with several counterparties and exploit further their information advantages
before the information becomes fully incorporated into the price. This may not only increase
trading volumes and wealth inequality but also reduce efficiency, as it is more likely to generate
informational cascades. Our results show that the latter effect may be equally or more impor-
tant than the former, thus associating higher connectivity to more volumes and inequality but
not more efficiency.
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Table 6: Market Trading Volume and Volume Ratio Estimations at each Minute
Volume Volume Ratio
Minute 1 Minute 2 Minute 3 Minute 1 Minute 2 Minute 3
Medium Connectivity −15.263∗∗∗ −11.039∗∗∗ −4.142 −0.088∗∗ 0.000 0.089∗∗
(2.219) (1.677) (3.186) (0.029) (0.034) (0.034)
Low Connectivity −17.656∗∗∗ −15.143∗∗∗ −7.535∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(2.138) (1.824) (2.002) (0.021) (0.008) (0.025)
Correct Public Info. −5.088∗∗ −3.437∗ −2.917 −0.006 0.011 −0.004
(2.124) (1.808) (2.235) (0.029) (0.019) (0.029)
Incorrect Public Info. −1.008 −1.440 1.928 −0.002 −0.024 0.026
(2.445) (1.648) (2.262) (0.032) (0.018) (0.027)
Net Private Info. −0.525∗∗ −0.079 0.110 −0.006∗∗ 0.002 0.004∗∗
(0.185) (0.143) (0.091) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 43.368∗∗∗ 30.803∗∗∗ 20.137∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗
(5.076) (4.082) (2.117) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033)
Observations 129 129 129 129 129 129
R-squared 0.591 0.478 0.204 0.158 0.066 0.173
Volume (Minute 1, Minute 2 and Minute 3) show the number of transactions in each minute. Volume Ratio (Minute 1,
Minute 2 and Minute 3) show ratio of transaction executed in each minute to the overall market volume. Low and medium
connectivity are dummy variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and incorrect public information
are dummy variables where no public information is the base category. The number of net correct private signals measures
the difference between total number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard errors corrected
for market-level clustering, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
Consistent with this, Table 6 shows that, although trading volumes under decentralization
are lower in each of the three minute intervals, the reduction of trading volumes because of
decentralization decreases over time. As shown in the first three columns, the coefficients
of medium and low connectivity are lower in absolute value in the regressions that use the
volume in the second, and especially in the third, minute. Moreover, as shown in the last
three columns, trading in the last minute, relative to the overall market volume, is significantly
higher in decentralized rather than in centralized markets. The connectivity variables in the
regressions on the volume ratio, defined as the fraction of trades in each minute, are positive
and significant.
5.2 Determinants of the Distribution of Wealth
We now describe the main determinants of profits at the individual trader level and, thus,
of wealth inequality across traders, comparing again centralized versus decentralized markets.
We present regressions of profits, stock bought/sold/held and prices against individual and
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transaction-level variables as well as the market variables of the previous subsection. As be-
havior and performance at the individual level are highly dependent of the level of the dividend,
we separate the observations by the realization of the dividend of the market.
Informed traders perform better, especially in the presence of connectivity
Table 7 shows the results of the profit regressions. In all columns, the effect of the variable
informed agent is by far the most significant and quantitatively important variable, whereas
the variable connected agent is never significant. In models 2 and 3 (columns three to six),
we interact the informed agent variable with the level of overall market connectivity and,
subsequently, with the variable being connected.15 They show that being informed is important
accross all treatments, especially in more connected markets, albeit the difference is often not
significant. But, being informed is more important if the agent herself is also more connected
than the rest of the agents of her market.
Centralization allows informed traders to trade faster in the right direction
Figure 6 show how the informed can exploit the uninformed relatively more in more connected
markets. Focusing in the case of no public information, we compute the distribution of trans-
actions of the informed/uninformed traders over time. That is, the figures display the total
number of transactions up to time t relative to the total number of transactions by the closing
of the market (averaged across all informed/uniformed agents across all markets). We include
as columns the cases of the (i) buyers and dividend 0, (ii) buyers and dividend 10, (iii) sellers
and dividend 0 and (iv) sellers and dividend 10. As rows, we include the case of centralized
(highly connected) as well as the medium and low connected markets.
The figure shows that, in centralized markets (column 1), informed traders buy more slowly
than uninformed traders when dividend is 0 and faster when the dividend is 10. Instead, they
sell faster than uninformed traders when dividend is 0 and more slowly when the dividend is
10. These effects are much less aparent in decentralized markets (columns 2 and 3). All these
results are confirmed by the Kolmogrov-Smirnov tests checking the equality of the distributions
displayed in Table 8. The distributions of the informed agents (buyers and sellers) are signifi-
15In the fully connected market all agents are equally connected so connected agent only applies to the medium
and low connected markets.
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Table 7: Agent Profit Estimations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dividend 0 Dividend 10 Dividend 0 Dividend 10 Dividend 0 Dividend 10
Informed Agent 20.375∗∗∗ 17.140∗∗∗ 28.661∗∗ 16.952∗ 28.657∗∗ 16.952∗
(3.846) (3.653) (9.145) (7.465) (9.150) (7.468)
Informed Agent * Medium Conn. −10.184 2.787 −13.177 1.355
(10.036) (8.889) (10.241) (8.630)
Informed Agent * Low Conn. −13.092 −1.729 −18.443* −4.284
(9.396) (8.845) (9.910) (8.832)
Connected Agent 0.849 −0.706 0.734 −0.614 −3.396 −2.596
(1.314) (1.385) (1.460) (1.238) (2.635) (2.474)
Informed Agent * Connected Agent 6.105** 2.967
(2.526) (2.063)
Medium Connectivity −0.737 0.269 6.017 −1.651 8.126 −0.661
(0.755) (0.601) (6.964) (5.637) (7.175) (5.504)
Low Connectivity −1.286 0.446 7.526 1.532 11.161† 3.222
(1.155) (1.187) (6.446) (5.774) (6.904) (5.942)
Correct Public Info. 0.138 0.048 0.118 0.070 0.170 0.044
(0.259) (0.155) (0.246) (0.158) (0.269) (0.170)
Incorrect Public Info. 0.051 −0.130 0.447 −0.190 0.703 −0.238
(0.330) (0.290) (0.431) (0.341) (0.458) (0.329)
Net Private Info. −0.474∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗ −0.462∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗ −0.451∗∗∗ −0.456∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.095) (0.091) (0.093) (0.090) (0.093)
Constant −4.562∗∗∗ 96.941∗∗∗ −10.268∗ 97.311∗∗∗ −10.523∗ 97.345∗∗∗
(1.026) (0.802) (5.220) (3.753) (5.203) (3.757)
Observations 1,035 900 1,035 900 1,035 900
R-squared 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10
Agents profits are the sum of the divdiend payment and the gains or losses generated by the trading activity. Informed
agent is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the subject has received two correct private signals. Connected agent
is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the number of edges it has (the degree) is above the median in that market.
Low and medium connectivity are dummy variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and incorrect
public information are dummy variables where no public information is the base category. The number of net correct private
signals measures the difference between total number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard
errors corrected for market-level clustering, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
cantly different than those of the uninformed in the centralized, highly connected, markets and
insignificant in the medium and low connected markets.
Table 8: KS Test Statistics for Equal Distributions
Buyer Seller
Dividend 0 Dividend 10 Dividend 0 Dividend 10
High Connectivity 0.1436∗∗ 0.2210∗∗∗ 0.2597∗∗∗ 0.2980∗∗∗
Medium Connectivity 0.1105 0.1271 0.0940 0.0660
Low Connectivity 0.0939 0.1105 0.0939 0.0718
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is checking the equality of the distribution of the informed and uninformed traders’
transactions. The test statistics are reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
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Informed also trade more in the right direction in more connected markets
We then decompose profits into stocks bought/sold/held and trading prices. In terms of the
quantities traded, Table 9 shows that informed traders in centralized markets earn more profits
by buying less stocks, selling more and thus holding less at the end of the market when the
dividend payout turns out to be 0, and by buying more stocks, selling less and thus holding
more at the end of the market when the dividend payout turns out to be 10. This is significantly
less the case in decentralized markets, as the interaction variables between informed agent and
medium/low connectivity always have the opposite sign, and they are highly significant. Notice
that, in absolute value, the interacted effects almost cancel the main effect in most cases, and
therefore the informed agents in decentralized markets trade in a similar way as the uniformed
traders. All this takes into account the effects of the market variables described before.
Table 9: Agent Stock Bought, Sold and Holding Estimations
Stock Bought Stock Sold Stock Holding
Dividend 0 Dividend 10 Dividend 0 Dividend 10 Dividend 0 Dividend 10
Informed Agent −6.543∗∗∗ 4.100∗∗∗ 2.319∗∗∗ −2.772∗∗∗ −8.863∗∗∗ 6.872∗∗∗
(1.934) (0.647) (0.434) (0.096) (2.260) (0.710)
Informed Agent * Medium Conn. 6.279∗∗ −3.602∗∗∗ −2.344∗∗∗ 2.381∗∗∗ 8.623∗∗∗ −5.984∗∗∗
(1.958) (0.718) (0.506) (0.469) (2.253) (0.951)
Informed Agent * Low Conn. 6.253∗∗ −2.894∗∗∗ −2.381∗∗∗ 3.347∗∗∗ 8.633∗∗∗ −6.241∗∗∗
(1.960) (0.765) (0.447) (0.537) (2.279) (0.756)
Connected Agent 0.453*** −0.644 −0.314 −0.324 0.768∗ −0.320
(0.129) (0.548) (0.235) (0.306) (0.349) (0.812)
Medium Connectivity −6.858∗∗∗ 1.148† −0.861∗∗ −2.965∗∗∗ −5.996∗∗∗ 4.113∗∗∗
(1.700) (0.661) (0.350) (0.320) (1.522) (0.837)
Low Connectivity −7.627∗∗∗ 0.073 −1.307∗∗ −4.307∗∗∗ −6.319∗∗∗ 4.380∗∗∗
(1.694) (0.506) (0.426) (0.397) (1.521) (0.856)
Correct Public Info. −0.321 −1.399∗∗∗ −0.316 −1.412∗∗∗ −0.005 0.013
(0.338) (0.334) (0.310) (0.340) (0.040) (0.036)
Incorrect Public Info. −0.146 −0.348 0.122 −0.414 −0.268† 0.066
(0.689) (0.280) (0.559) (0.308) (0.151) (0.124)
Net Private Info. −0.014 −0.059∗ −0.067∗ 0.016 0.053 −0.075∗∗
(0.043) (0.031) (0.035) (0.017) (0.034) (0.032)
Constant 10.310*** 4.280∗∗∗ 5.462∗∗∗ 7.429∗∗∗ 14.847∗∗∗ 6.851∗∗∗
(1.774) (0.711) (0.897) (0.523) (1.234) (0.680)
Observations 1,035 900 1,035 900 1,035 900
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.06
Informed agent is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the subject has received two correct private signals. Connected
agent is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the number of edges it has (the degree) is above the median in that
market. Low and medium connectivity are dummy variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and
incorrect public information are dummy variables where no public information is the base category. The number of net
correct private signals measures the difference between total number of correct and incorrect private information in a
market. The standard errors corrected for market-level clustering, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1, † p<0.15
24
Informed do not trade at better prices in more connected markets Table
10 shows that, overall, informed traders do not trade at significantly different prices than the
uninformed. The only signficant effect related to informed agents is that the informed end
up paying a higher price as a buyer when the dividend is 10. Instead, in terms of the other
important type of transaction (selling when the dividend is 0), informed agents sell at a lower
price, although the effect is not signifcant. Overall, informed agents, both as buyers and sellers,
do not trade at significantly different prices in more or less connected markets either. Finally,
notice that prices tend to the fundamental as time goes by, that is they decrease when the
dividend is 0 and increase when the dividend is 10.
5.3 Signal precision
We now compare the main results with relatively precise signals (probability of a correct signal
equal to q = 0.8) with those in which the agents receive less precise signals (q = 0.66). We
focus on the treatments with non-fully connected agents (medium and low connectivity) and
no public information. Table 11 describes the results of the market level regressions as well as
the regression on profits.
Notice that, as in the baseline results in the case of no public signal, highly decentralized
markets exhibit less trading, more inefficiency but also less inequality than moderately decen-
tralized markets. These effects are exhacerbated in the case of low precision signals. As it can
be seen in the interaction between low connectivity and low precision in model 2, the difference
is significant, and has the same sign as the main effect, in all cases (volumes, inefficiency and
inequality).
As in the main results, being informed is a significant determinant of profits whereas being
connected is not. Being informed is again more important in more connected markets, as the
interactions with low connectivity are negative and significant in both regressions. Also as in
the main results, being informed is more important if one is also connected, as the interaction
is positive and significant (at 15% in the case of dividend 0). The importance of being informed
as one is also connected is even stronger in markets with low precision, as coefficients of the
triple interaction are positive and significant (at 15% in the case of dividend 10).
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6 Conclusion
In the light of recent proposals to change the organization of asset trading on international mar-
kets, an assessment of the performance of decentralised markets, as compared to centralised
ones, deserves more attention. The complexity of trading in decentralised markets makes it
unsatisfactory to rely uniquely on simplified theoretical models. The unobservability of real
markets’ crucial variables, such as the fundamental value of a financial asset and the distribu-
tion of information among traders, makes it difficult to answer relevant questions through the
use of field data. The experimental approach offers the advantage that traders’ preferences,
information and network structure can be exogenously controlled, while market efficiency and
profits can be directly measured. Despite the economic relevance of decentralised markets, and
the suitability of experimental work, very few experimental studies have explored the efficiency
properties of decentralised markets, as compared to centralised markets.
Our results show that, despite having lower trading volumes, decentralized markets may
not be more inefficient. Although information can propagate quicker through highly connected
markets, reducing market inefficiency and profit opportunities from information asymmetry,
higher connectivity induces informed traders to trade faster and exploit further their informa-
tion advantages before the information becomes fully incorporated into the price. This not
only increases trading volumes but also reduce efficiency, as it may generate informational cas-
cades. We show that the latter effect may be equally or more important than the former, thus
associating higher connectivity to more volumes but not more efficiency.
We also show that centralized trading, despite not being more efficient, it increases wealth
inequality. As higher connectivity induces informed traders to trade relatively faster to exploit
their information advantages, not only efficiency may be reduced, but wealth inequality may
also be increased. We provide evidence that, in more connected markets, informed traders
trade not only quicker but also more in the right direction, despite not doing it at better prices.
Our results thus challenge the conventional wisdom highlighting the informational ineffi-
ciencies of decentralized as compared to centralized markets, and are in line with some of the
recent theoretical papers that emphasise the virtues of decentralization (Malamud and Rostek,
2017, and Glode and Opp, 2016). Our results should provide evidence against the criticisms of
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OTC markets made by commentators and policy makers.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on insider trading by showing that superiorly
informed traders are able to earn relatively larger profits in centralized markets. Thus, if reg-
ulators have concerns about the welfare of less informed investors, either because of inequality
concerns or because these investors may ultimately exit the marketplace, our paper adds an-
other concern about the outcomes of centralized markets. This is especially important given
that, as shown in the paper, more egalitarian outcomes may not come at the expense of less ef-
ficient outcomes. Understanding the trading behavior of insiders can help in designing policies
to detect insider trading and, more generally, to regulate securities markets.
The main objective of our analysis, and the proposed framework, is to understand and isolate
the role of connectivity, a key difference between centralised and decentralised markets. But
our results also show the virtues of a proposal for an "intermediate" market design, in which
not all traders are connected to each other, as in decentralised markets, but trading occurs
through a centralised market mechanism, as in centralised markets, rather than through the
standard counterparty search and private bargaining of decentralised markets. As mentioned
before, several platforms in the foreign exchange spot market, including Reuters, EBS, and
Hotspot FX, already use a similar market design.
We show that this intermediate design can be optimal even if the market is liquid enough to
allow for a fully centralised market. Indeed, we show that limiting the number of counterparties,
if it does not increase the search costs, can decrease wealth inequality without reducing market
efficiency. By reducing connectivity, the incentives to quickly exploit (and the fear of being
quickly exploited by) information advantages can be reduced. Our proposed market design
would allow traders to limit the number of partners with which to interact, as in decentralised
markets, while maintaining anonymity, as in centralised markets. That would be an alternative
to the dark pools, which some investors use to hide trades from the rest of the participants.
Of course, the reasons to limit trading with some market participants can be non-economic
(e.g., social values) or economic (e.g. counterparty risk). The results of the paper would be
directly relevant for the cases in which one selects counterparties for exogenous reasons, for
instance because of corporate social responsibility. But one would need to add, and investigate
how it interacts with ex-post trading, the ex-ante choice of trading partners in case of selection
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for economic reasons. This is a challenging task that we leave for further research.
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Table 10: Transaction Price Estimations
Model 1 Model 2
Variables Dividend 0 Dividend 10 Dividend 0 Dividend 10
Informed Buyer −0.187 0.216∗∗ −0.382† 0.359∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.092) (0.232) (0.053)
Informed Buyer * Medium Conn. 0.238 −0.213
(0.272) (0.268)
Informed Buyer * Low Conn. 0.562* −0.249
(0.276) (0.194)
Informed Seller −0.067 −0.025 −0.062 −0.087
(0.157) (0.146) (0.315) (0.173)
Informed Seller * Medium Conn. 0.223 0.052
(0.428) (0.206)
Informed Seller * Low Conn. −0.342 0.184
(0.358) (0.306)
Connected Buyer −0.593∗∗∗ −0.387† −0.570∗∗∗ −0.386
(0.112) (0.235) (0.105) (0.245)
Connected Seller 0.016 0.002 0.007 0.002
(0.114) (0.214) (0.118) (0.220)
Time −0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Medium Connectivity −0.205 −0.025 −0.458 0.117
(0.119) (0.566) (0.359) (0.766)
Low Connectivity 0.076 −0.016 −0.017 0.064
(0.168) (0.495) (0.267) (0.593)
Correct Public Info. −1.116∗∗∗ 2.584∗∗∗ −1.098∗∗∗ 2.590∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.123) (0.129) (0.125)
Incorrect Public Info. 3.198∗∗∗ −0.263 3.173∗∗∗ −0.264
(0.225) (0.773) (0.221) (0.763)
Net Private Info. −0.155∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ −0.158∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.225) (0.773) (0.221) (0.763)
Constant 6.956∗∗∗ 3.950∗∗∗ 7.065∗∗∗ 3.832∗∗∗
(0.718) (0.884) (0.777) (0.933)
Observations 3,652 3,365 3,652 3,365
R-squared 0.513 0.429 0.516 0.430
Informed buyer/seller is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the buyer/seller has received two correct private signals.
Connected buyer/seller is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the number of edges it has (the degree) is above the
median in that market. Time shows the seconds in which that transaction occurs. Low and medium connectivity are dummy
variables where high connectivity is the base category. Correct and incorrect public information are dummy variables where
no public information is the base category. The number of net correct private signals measures the difference between total
number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard errors corrected for market-level clustering,
are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
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Table 11: Market and Agent Level Estimations with Signal Precision
Volume Inefficiency Inequality Profit
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Dividend 0 Dividend 10
Low Connectivity −15.469∗∗∗−10.039∗∗∗ 0.417∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ −0.016∗ −0.005 ∗∗ 7.337∗∗∗ 7.881∗∗∗
(2.524) (0.542) (0.097) (0.026) (0.005) (0.001) (0.355) (0.521)
Low Precision 1.948 −12.876 0.075 −1.931∗∗ −0.003 −0.035 −1.106 −3.279
(2.673) (10.721) (0.356) (0.508) (0.006) (0.022) (1.576) (2.617)
Net Private Information −0.834† −1.736∗ −0.140∗∗ −0.218∗∗∗ −0.002† −0.004 ∗∗ −0.681∗∗∗ −0.681∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.575) (0.035) (0.028) (0.001) (0.001) (0.098) (0.126)
Low Connectivity * Low Precision −9.252∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ −0.019 ∗∗∗
(0.780) (0.034) (0.002)
Net Private Info. * Low Precision 1.223 0.124∗∗ 0.003
(0.649) (0.030) (0.001)
Informed Agent 24.394∗∗∗ 30.219∗∗∗
(1.090) (1.122)
Informed Agent*Low Conn. −11.495∗∗∗ −7.716∗∗∗
(0.693) (0.888)
Informed Agent*Low Precision 4.575† −3.671
(2.305) (3.456)
Connected Agent 1.463 −1.868
(1.164) (4.023)
Connected Agent*Low Conn. −2.172 −7.889
(1.426) (4.252)
Connected Agent*Low Precision −8.548∗ 0.611
(2.832) (6.366)
Informed Agent*Connected Agent 4.318† 5.544∗∗
(2.153) (1.131)
Informed Ag.*Connected Ag.*Low Prec. 10.738∗∗ 14.702†
(3.269) (7.297)
Constant 68.404∗∗∗ 82.144∗∗∗ 5.263∗∗∗ 6.729∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.109 ∗∗ −5.607∗ 93.967∗∗∗
(5.686) (10.267) (0.719) (0.494) (0.014) (0.019) (1.796) (2.038)
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 480 405
R-squared 0.41 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.34 0.41 0.15 0.25
This table only considers Medium and Low Connected Markets with High and Low Precision. Low Precision is a dummy
variable that indicates the treatments where the private signals are correct 66% of the probability (q=0.66). High Precision
Treatments are the base category where the private signals are correct at 80% of the probability (q=0.8). Volume, Inefficiency
and Gini Coefficient are estimated at the market level, and profit is estimated at the agent level. Informed agent is a dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 if the subject has received two correct private signals. Connected agent is a dummy variable
which takes a value of 1 if the number of edges it has (the degree) is above the median in that market. Low connectivity is
the dummy variable where medium connectivity is the base category. The number of net correct private signals measures
the difference between total number of correct and incorrect private information in a market. The standard errors corrected
for market-level clustering, are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † p<0.15
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7 Appendix
Instructions for Experiments for "Fully/Highly Connected Markets (HC)" with no
public information
This is an economic experiment on decision making in financial markets. The instructions
are simple and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount of money. Your
earnings will be communicated to you privately, and paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
During the experiment your earnings will be measured in points that will become e at the end
of the experiment using a rate of e1 for every 50 accumulated points, plus a fixed amount of
e3, as show-up fee for participating The corresponding amount in e will be paid in cash at the
end of the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment each of you has been assigned a
number. From now on, you and the rest of the participants will be identified by that number.
No communication is allowed among the participants during the experiment. Any participant
who does not comply will be invited to leave the experiment without payment.
The Market
The experiment consists of 15 periods of 3 minutes each. The market is composed of 15
participants. At the beginning of each period you will be randomly paired with another 14
participants. At the beginning of each period your initial portfolio consists of 10 assets and
1000 EU cash. Each participant has the same initial portfolio. In each period, you and the
other participants will have the opportunity to buy and/or sell the assets. You can buy and
sell as many assets as you want, although each bid, ask and transaction involves the exchange
of one asset. Therefore, the assets are exchanged one at a time.
Information and Dividens
At the end of each period, you will receive a given dividend for the assets you hold in your
portfolio. The value of the dividend can be 0 or 10 with the same probability. Thus, without
additional information, the value of the assets can be 0 or 10 with a probability of 50%.
Likewise, you will receive private information about the value of the dividend at the end of the
period in the form of signals. If you receive:
• A private signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 80% the value of the dividend
will be 0 at the end of the period.
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• private signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 80% the value of the dividend
will be 10 at the end of the period.
This will be your private information and therefore you will be the only one able to see it.
At the end of each period, your profit will be the cash you have at the end of the period plus
the dividends for the assets you own minus the 1000UE that is given to you at the beginning of
the period. Your payment at the end of the experiment corresponds to the accumulated profit
in all periods. If at any time you have any question or problem, do not hesitate to contact the
experimentalist. Remember that it is important that you understand correctly the operation
of the market, since your earnings depend both on your decisions and on the decisions of the
other participants in your market.
Instructions for Experiments for "Medium/Low Connected Markets (MC, LC)"
with no public information Welcome. This is an economic experiment on decision making
in financial markets. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully, you can
earn a considerable amount of money. Your earnings will be communicated to you privately,
and paid in cash at the end of the experiment. During the experiment your earnings will be
measured in points that will become e at the end of the experiment using a rate of e1 for
every 50 accumulated points, plus a fixed amount of e3, as show-up fee for participating The
corresponding amount in e will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. At the beginning
of the experiment each of you has been assigned a number. From now on, you and the rest of
the participants will be identified by that number. No communication is allowed among the
participants during the experiment. Any participant who does not comply will be invited to
leave the experiment without payment.
The Market
The experiment consists of 15 periods of 3 minutes each. The market is composed of 15
participants connected to each other through a network. At the beginning of each period you
will be paired randomly with a subset of participants. At the beginning of each period your
initial portfolio consists of 10 assets and 1000 EU cash. Each participant has the same initial
portfolio. In each period, you and the other participants will have the opportunity to buy
and/or sell assets only with those participants with whom you are connected. You can buy
and sell as assets as you want, although each bid, ask and transaction involves the exchange of
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a single asset. Therefore, the assets are exchanged one at a time.
Information and Dividens
At the end of each period, you will receive a given dividend for the assets you hold in your
portfolio. The value of the dividend can be 0 or 10 with the same probability. Thus, without
additional information, the value of the assets can be 0 or 10 with a probability of 50%.
Likewise, you will receive private information about the value of the dividend at the end of the
period in the form of signals. If you receive:
• A private signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 80% the value of the dividend
will be 0 at the end of the period.
• A private signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 80% the value of the dividend
will be 10 at the end of the period.
This will be your private information and therefore you will be the only one able to see it.
At the end of each period, your profit will be the cash you have at the end of the period plus the
dividends for the assets you own minus the 1000UE that were given to you at the beginning of
the period. Your payment at the end of the experiment corresponds to the accumulated profit
in all periods. If at any time you have any question or problem, do not hesitate to contact the
experimentalist. Remember that it is important that you understand correctly the operation
of the market, since your earnings depend both on your decisions and on the decisions of the
other participants in your market.
Instructions for Experiments for "Medium/Low Connected Markets (MC, LC)"
with public information
Welcome. This is an economic experiment on decision making in financial markets. The
instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully, you can earn a considerable amount
of money. Your earnings will be communicated to you privately, and paid in cash at the end
of the experiment. During the experiment your earnings will be measured in points that will
become e at the end of the experiment using a rate of e1 for every 50 accumulated points, plus
a fixed amount of e3, as show-up fee for participating The corresponding amount in e will be
paid in cash at the end of the experiment. At the beginning of the experiment each of you has
been assigned a number. From now on, you and the rest of the participants will be identified
by that number. No communication is allowed among the participants during the experiment.
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Any participant who does not comply will be invited to leave the experiment without payment.
The Market
The experiment consists of 15 periods of 3 minutes each. The market is composed of 15
participants connected to each other through a network. At the beginning of each period you
will be paired randomly with a subset of participants. At the beginning of each period your
initial portfolio consists of 10 assets and 1000 EU cash. Each participant has the same initial
portfolio. In each period, you and the other participants will have the opportunity to buy
and/or sell assets only with those participants with whom you are connected. You can buy
and sell as assets as you want, although each bid, ask and transaction involves the exchange of
a single asset. Therefore, the assets are exchanged one at a time.
Information and Dividens
At the end of each period, you will receive a given dividend for the assets you hold in your
portfolio. The value of the dividend can be 0 or 10 with the same probability. Thus, without
additional information, the value of the assets can be 0 or 10 with a probability of 50%. You
will receive additional information about the value of the dividend in the form of signals. All
market participants will receive at the beginning of each period public information in the form
of a public signal that will be correct with a probability of 80%, that is:
• A public signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 80% the final value of the
asset will be 0 at the end of the period.
• A public signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 80% the final value of the
asset will be 10 at the end of the period.
Recall that the public signal will be the same for all market participants. Likewise, you
will receive private information about the value of the dividend at the end of the period in the
form of two independent signals. If you receive:
• A private signal equal to 0 means that with a probability of 80% the value of the dividend
will be 0 at the end of the period.
• A private signal equal to 10 means that with a probability of 80% the value of the dividend
will be 10 at the end of the period.
This will be your private information and therefore you will be the only one able to see it.
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At the end of each period, your profit will be the cash you have at the end of the period plus the
dividends for the assets you own minus the 1000UE that were given to you at the beginning of
the period. Your payment at the end of the experiment corresponds to the accumulated profit
in all periods. If at any time you have any question or problem, do not hesitate to contact the
experimentalist. Remember that it is important that you understand correctly the operation
of the market, since your earnings depend both on your decisions and on the decisions of the
other participants in your market.
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